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ABSTRACT 
Sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent 
modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part 
they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satisfaction of 
most governments and private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to date are 
highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they would have 
been stymied when confronted with a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of academic economists, legal scholars, and policy 
gurus focused their attention upon the alleged inefficiencies in international financial markets that 
supposedly had contributed to systemic financial crises throughout Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil – 
and especially in Argentina, the locus of the world’s largest default up to that point in time. 
 
The scribblers argued that globalization had spawned increasingly diverse, diffuse, and 
unmanageable creditor and debtor communities that posed coordination and collective-action 
problems. No longer could a relatively small syndicate of commercial banks gather quickly in New 
York or London, spurred into action by urgent telephone calls from their supervisory authorities, to 
deal with whatever financial emergency had erupted in some distant corner of the world. As a result, 
governments that lost the confidence of their bank depositors, bondholders, or bank creditors, or 
fell victim to regional ‘contagion’ effects, were claimed to be unable to work out constructive 
solutions prior to a major currency, banking, or debt crisis. 
 
After a crisis erupted, it was alleged, financial stability could only be restored through the 
extension of massive loan packages from the G-7 governments acting through the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, these financial rescues reportedly were generating moral hazard 
and other adverse systemic risks – particularly in situations where nations’ debt sustainability was 
questionable. And when sovereign liabilities needed to be restructured or written down, the story 
went, the absence of an orderly sovereign bankruptcy mechanism meant that workouts were 
delayed, and their effectiveness was undermined, by ‘free riders’ and ‘rogue’ (holdout) creditors. 
 
This focus on the alleged shortcomings of financial globalization, and the seeming repetition 
of currency, banking and/or sovereign debt crises, spawned various concrete proposals to reform 
the international financial architecture (Porzecanski, 2005). The ‘statutory approach’ argued for the 
creation of a supranational bankruptcy authority that would adjudicate financial claims on troubled 
sovereigns in an expeditious manner, overriding contracts written in national jurisdictions. The 
‘contractual approach’, on the other hand, called for the modification of boilerplate bond clauses – 
especially under New York law – in ways that would facilitate communication among creditors and 
with the sovereign debtor, restrain disruptive litigation, and enable restructuring decisions by a 
qualified majority of creditors rather than by unanimous consent. 
 
Initially, several academics urged, and the G-7 governments favored, consideration of both 
approaches. However, this was generally resisted by both the financial industry and the largest 
sovereign issuers in the emerging markets. In the end, the government of Mexico and its bankers 
decided to issue a bond, in early 2003, subject to New York law but incorporating innovative 
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‘collective action clauses’ (CACs), in exchange for the U.S. Treasury embracing the contractual 
approach to reforms (Taylor, 2007: 111-32). The transaction was successful because investors did 
not demand a premium for the contractual innovation, and ever since then, most sovereign bond 
issues under U.S. law have incorporated the said clauses at no obvious additional cost (Bradley et al., 
2010: 297, 320). 
 
The impetus to continue to reform the rules and practices of international finance subsided 
for about a decade, until the Greek financial crisis erupted in 2010-12 and led to a massive official 
rescue underwritten by the European Union (EU) and the IMF – only to result in a record-breaking 
default more than twice the size of Argentina’s a decade earlier. But it was not until long-simmering 
litigation against Argentina began to yield victories for holdout creditors in 2012-14 that the G-20 
countries mobilized to introduce a further contractual reform. 
 
The crisis in Greece engendered regrets in official and academic circles because the passage 
of time revealed that IMF and EU emergency lending had been utilized in part to finance the exit of 
private creditors in the two years ahead of the restructuring of government debt in March 2012 
(IMF, 2014: 12). Moreover, while the eventual restructuring of obligations in the hands of local and 
foreign private investors achieved a very high creditor participation rate of 97 percent, despite being 
pre-emptive and involving massive debt forgiveness, the IMF and mostly European policymakers 
and academics bemoaned the fact that it was not 100 percent comprehensive. The leakage of 3 
percent was accounted by the fact that the owners of 19 of the 36 Greek government bonds subject 
to English law had not participated in the debt relief operation, because blocking majorities of 
holdout creditors had exercised their rights under those bonds’ CACs to prevent any changes to 
their payment terms (IMF, 2013: 28). 
 
The saga of litigation against Argentina on the part of holdout creditors who refused to 
exchange their original bonds for new ones worth a fraction – bondholders who accounted for 7 
percent of the government’s bonded debt in default as of 2002 – became a source of concern to the 
IMF and a variety of governments and academics once the holdouts finally scored important judicial 
victories. These included a June 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision not to hear Argentina’s appeal of 
lower federal court rulings which (a) had found Argentina in breach of a clause in its defaulted 
bonds – the so-called pari passu clause – pledging to treat all bondholders equally, and (b) had 
prohibited Argentina from making payments to creditors who had accepted new bonds unless it 
paid also holdout creditors what they were owed. The governments of Brazil, France, Mexico and 
the United States filed legal briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that these rulings would 
have a negative impact on the orderly and timely conduct of sovereign debt restructurings by 
encouraging more bondholders to resist going along with future sovereign debt restructuring. 
Several law firms, academics, policy groups, and international bodies likewise expressed their 
opposition to the verdicts (IMF, 2014: 7-13). 
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THE CASE FOR STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL 
REFORMS 
 
The most outspoken critic of the existing international financial architecture has been Joseph 
Stiglitz, the heterodox economist who in numerous books, articles, opinion pieces and speeches has 
called for a comprehensive international bankruptcy procedure to ensure the proper resolution of 
sovereign debt crises (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a).(1) Stiglitz has gone beyond the confines of 
academia to flog his ideas, serving as an advisor to, and public advocate and expert witness for, 
Presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner of Argentina in their quest to impose the punishing 2005 
debt restructuring on holdouts who had court-validated rights to refuse any such cramdown 
(Johnson 2014). However, Stiglitz has been surprisingly short on concrete reform proposals, putting 
forth that “there should be a global agreement that no country can surrender its sovereign immunity 
(even voluntarily)” to creditors, combined with the establishment of “an oversight commission 
[made up of government representatives] with the mission of mediating and supervising the [debt] 
restructuring process” of sovereigns (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a: 22).(2) 
 
José Ocampo, Stiglitz’s colleague at Columbia University, has been inspired by the dispute-
settlement process at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which follows three consecutive stages 
with clear deadlines: one of voluntary negotiations, a second of mediation, and a final of arbitration, 
if the former two fail. He has been advocating for a similar mechanism to be established for 
sovereign debt restructurings, possibly to be hosted by the IMF but independent of it, to ensure a 
process that would be efficient, impartial and speedy with a result that is binding on all parties 
involved (Ocampo, 2016). 
 
Jürgen Kaiser, of Jubilee Germany, has been advocating for a state insolvency process 
through international arbitration, an updated version of proposals which first circulated in the 1990s, 
because in his view both the sovereign debtor as well as good-faith creditors have the most to win 
through an impartially facilitated compromise.(3) He does not call for a new international 
organization, nor a costly bureaucracy, but rather for a liaison office to arrange for ad hoc mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration services, with panels nominated freely by the parties based on a mutual 
agreement, whenever sovereigns are looking for a comprehensive solution to their looming or acute 
sovereign debt problems (Kaiser, 2016). 
 
As of mid-2016, none of these statutory reforms or any others had gained traction, whereas 
certain draft contractual reforms had earned strong support in G-20 official circles, were adopted by 
law in Europe, and have been incorporated by a number of sovereign debtors and accepted by 
bondholders elsewhere. The first reform involves the introduction of so-called ‘super-CACs’ 
containing aggregation provisions. Their purpose is to limit the ability of holdout creditors to 
impede restructurings acceptable to a supermajority of creditors, because whereas voting under 
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existing CACs is to be carried out by holders of one bond series at a time, the new clauses 
contemplate aggregated, simultaneous voting across all debt instruments subject to a restructuring 
with binding effect on all bond series. 
 
In the wake of growing concern that the Greek restructuring of March 2012 would 
encourage more holdouts in the future, the European Council decided, and the treaty establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism enshrined, that as of the start of 2013 a new aggregation clause 
would be mandatorily included in all new euro-area government securities with a maturity greater 
than one year.(4) In August 2014, following an extensive consultative process with financial 
intermediaries, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published suggested wording 
for aggregation CACs to be utilized by sovereign issuers around the world, and these clauses have 
since come into use with Mexico once again taking the lead (Makoff and Kahn, 2015; Gelpern et al., 
2016).(5) During the period from 1 October 2014 to 31 July 2015, there were 73 international 
sovereign bond placements, by 37 different sovereign issuers, for a total nominal principal amount 
of approximately US$ 86 billion. And, out of these, 42 bonds, representing about 60 percent of the 
nominal principal amount of total issuance, included the super-CACs (IMF, 2015: 4). 
 
The second reform involved the introduction of a model pari passu clause, responding to 
concerns about the implications of the Argentina litigation for future bonds, as voiced by the IMF 
and G-20 governments (IMF, 2015: 2-3). The proposed language was likewise first published by 
ICMA in August 2014, intending to mitigate the risk that other courts would read into the clause the 
interpretation given by the U.S. courts in the case of Argentina’s clause. It explicitly states that while 
a debt will rank pari passu with all other unsecured debt of the issuer, there is no implied 
requirement that the issuer must pay its debts at the same time (technically, on an equal or ratable 
basis).(6) The model pari passu clause has been adopted in tandem with the super-CACs by most 
sovereigns issuing new debt between 1 October 2014 and 31 July 2015 (IMF, 2015: 8). 
 
THE CASE AGAINST STATUTORY REFORMS 
 
It would appear that those who have been advocating for statutory reforms of the international 
financial architecture are not persuaded that the latest round of contractual reforms is sufficient to 
remedy whatever deficiencies they perceive. Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, recently wrote about 
Argentina’s settlement with its holdout creditors: 
 
‘This resolution will carry a high price for the international financial system, encouraging 
other funds to hold out and making debt restructuring virtually impossible’ (Guzman and 
Stiglitz, 2016b)  
 
His colleague José Ocampo, for his part, had previously written:  
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‘The most important effect of the U.S. rulings, however, is that they discourage any future 
voluntary debt renegotiation, for obvious reasons: if investors know they have a chance to 
claim full payment through the courts, why would they take part in any restructuring?’ 
(Ocampo, 2014) 
 
It is not hard to disagree with these pessimistic assessments for several reasons. First, the 
record shows that most sovereign debt restructurings have been handled expeditiously despite the 
absence of a world sovereign bankruptcy regime. Neither the threat nor the act of litigation, nor 
isolated instances of ‘rogue creditor’ behavior, have thwarted the debt restructurings that have 
needed to be accomplished.  
 
According to a Moody’s analysis of 34 sovereign bond restructurings from 2008 through 
early 2013, the evidence shows that negotiations between sovereigns and their private creditors have 
proceeded fairly quickly, such that on average debt restructurings were completed within seven 
months after the start of negotiations.(7) In only two cases have holdout creditors represented more 
than ten per cent of the value of outstanding bonds, and in just one of those instances – that of 
Argentina – did the holdouts engage in persistent litigation (Duggar, 2013). This is the case because 
most sovereigns have made reasonable debt relief demands from their creditors and have pursued 
good-faith negotiations – whereas Argentina did neither. In fact, the unilateral, coercive and 
aggressive mode with which the authorities in that country went about managing, defaulting and 
restructuring their debt obligations stands out in a comprehensive academic study of the nature of 
past sovereign debt disputes: 
 
‘The well-known case of Argentina from 2001 to 2005 displays an exceptional degree of 
coerciveness, as the government officially declares a default, sticks to the proclaimed 
moratorium by stopping all payments to its bondholders for four years, freezes foreign 
assets, and rejects any meaningful negotiations’ (Enderlein et al., 2012: 261). 
 
Second, by now most international sovereign bonds include the first-generation CACs binding 
investors in any one debt instrument to the decisions of a supermajority, and as mentioned above, 
the bulk of new bonds issued since late 2014 include the super-CACs. Indeed, whereas at the end of 
2002 a mere one-third of international sovereign bonds featured CACs, by mid-2014 that proportion 
had risen to about 80 percent (IMF, 2014: 17). While the first-generation CACs do not eliminate the 
holdout problem witnessed during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, which was a minor one 
involving creditors obtaining blocking position in particular bond series, they would have minimized 
Argentina’s significant holdout problem if they had figured in that country’s obligations. However, 
because Argentina’s default in late 2001 involved mostly bonds issued during the 1990s, very few of 
them included CACs and the bulk required the unanimous consent of their owners for any 
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amendments to their payment terms – the feature which attracted, and then empowered, holdouts 
(Duggar, 2014). 
 
Third, sovereigns are free to repurchase whichever bonds they regard as potentially 
problematic – for instance because they do not feature first- or second-generation CACs – while 
issuing new ones with whatever promissory language they are prepared to honor. The fact that no 
sovereign issuer is known to have engaged in such a liability-management operation to accelerate the 
incorporation of the enhanced contractual provisions (IMF, 2015: 10) suggests that most sovereigns 
do not contemplate ever managing, defaulting on, and restructuring their debt obligations in the 
same unilateral, coercive, aggressive and ultimately self-defeating manner as Argentina did. 
 
Fourth, pari passu language is usually not as holdout-friendly as was the one in Argentina’s 
indentures from the 1990s at the heart of the country’s default. Pari passu clauses are a standard 
feature of sovereign bond contracts, but there are three major formulations, the most common of 
which appears in the majority of sovereign bonds issued over the past two decades, and in almost all 
bonds issued earlier – and it is not suitable for Argentina-style litigation (Duggar, 2014: 2).(8) 
Moreover, there already is one case where a holdout creditor tried but failed to use the ruling in the 
Argentina case as a suitable precedent. The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
chose not to participate in the restructuring of Grenada’s debt in 2005, and in March 2013 the bank 
filed a lawsuit against Grenada based on the pari passu violation argument used against Argentina. 
However, in August 2013, the federal district court in New York ruled that the Argentina decision 
was limited to Argentina’s unique set of circumstances and did not apply to Grenada’s (Alfaro, 2015: 
70-71). 
 
Fifth, the threat of holdout creditors actually has been a force mainly for good in the 
international financial landscape. Sovereign distressed-debt investors have been characterized as 
disruptive to the restructuring process and unfair to the creditors that participate in restructurings. 
However, just like distressed-debt investors can expedite business reorganizations and protect going-
concern enterprise values in the private sector (Goldschmid, 2005), ‘vulture investors’ can and often 
do play a salutary role in the sovereign debt context by advancing creditor rights (Fisch and Gentile, 
2004: 1097-1101).  
 
Unlike many risk- and confrontation-averse institutional and retail investors, opportunistic 
investors are more likely to challenge aggressive sovereigns and motivate them to make a better offer 
than they would otherwise make to the meeker creditors. In the case of Argentina, tens of thousands 
of elderly retail investors benefited from the litigation spearheaded by the distressed-debt investors 
(Mander, 2016) – and hundreds of thousands more would have benefited if the wheels of justice had 
only turned faster. Holdout litigation can also serve as a potential check on opportunistic defaults by 
sovereign debtors, and it was sorely missing in the blatant case of Ecuador in 2008-09 (Porzecanski, 
2010). It boggles the mind that so much of the academic and policymaking literature has ignored the 
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realistic possibility that rogue sovereign debtors like Argentina, rather than holdout private creditors, 
are the ones that pose the greater threat to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial 
architecture (Porzecanski, 2005: 331). 
 
Sixth, Argentina’s behavior during 2002-2015 demonstrates why none of the proposed 
statutory reforms would work in the case of a similarly recalcitrant, dishonorable sovereign debtor. 
If governments around the globe were to agree not to surrender their sovereign immunity 
voluntarily when accessing the leading financial markets, as Stiglitz has proposed, then 
uncreditworthy sovereigns like Argentina would never be able to raise funding outside their own 
borders. Argentina recently sold the largest-ever amount of bonds placed abroad by any emerging-
market economy after making up with its creditors (Platt and Moore, 2016) – but only after 
surrendering its sovereign immunity irrevocably, as it had always done prior to the 2001 default. 
 
And if there were to be an oversight commission made up of government representatives 
with the mission of mediating and supervising the debt restructuring process of sovereigns, then 
Argentina would not have accomplished a restructuring when it wanted it, because in 2002 the 
country was barely on speaking terms with the official international community. In fact, Argentina at 
the time also defaulted to its official bilateral creditors (namely, the world’s export-credit and 
foreign-aid agencies) – and it remained in default to them for over a dozen years (Mander, 2014). It 
is hard to conceive that the country would have turned to a group of foreign government officials 
for mediation and supervision in the early 2000s, when it was in such a confrontational mood. 
 
In terms of a dispute-settlement process for sovereign debtors akin to that for trade disputes 
at the WTO, that would not have worked well, either. During the past two decades, Argentina has 
been the target of more trade complaints triggering dispute-settlement procedures than any country 
in Latin America – more than any other developing country except for China and India, in fact 
(WTO, 2015). In recent years, Argentina went through a heated WTO dispute-settlement process 
because of the stringent import restrictions that it imposed after 2010. The country was found guilty 
of breaking the WTO rules in 2014 and again (after an appeal) in 2015. It subsequently pledged to 
remove the restrictions by end-2015, but as of mid-2016, even the new government in Buenos Aires 
had yet to abolish all the import controls that it was supposed to remove (Baker & McKenzie 2015; 
WTO 2016). This track record does not inspire confidence that any WTO-like, debt-resolution 
mechanism would have met Argentina’s approval in the early 2000s unless it had validated the 
country’s aggressive debt-relief objectives. 
 
As concerns the applicability of a state insolvency process through international arbitration, 
the fact is that since 2001 Argentina has likewise been the target of numerous claims filed with 
tribunals under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) – the most ever against a country party to those conventions. Argentina dragged 
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all the cases out for as many years as possible through endless challenges and appeals, and whenever 
it lost arbitrations definitively, it either did not pay the resulting awards or it paid them in part after 
long delays (Cancel 2013, Porzecanski, 2015). In this regard, Argentina’s rogue behavior in 
connection with arbitration proceedings was consistent with its refusal to obey and pay foreign court 
judgments, and it is highly suggestive of the lack of efficacy that an arbitral vehicle for state 
insolvency matters would have had in Argentina’s case. 
 
Finally, advocacy for statutory reforms is pointless because there has not been a willingness 
on the part of most governments and most private creditors to depart from the current financial 
architecture. Governments are evidently unwilling to cede their sovereignty when it comes to such 
important matters as their creditworthiness and capacity to respond quickly to any economic or 
financial emergency they may confront. And bond investors and commercial lenders are likewise 
unwilling to cede their creditor rights to a mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process without the 
inclination and enforcement powers to confront wayward governments – especially now that the 
U.S. judiciary proved able to checkmate an insubordinate sovereign such as Argentina. 
 
In sum, sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent 
modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part 
they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satisfaction of 
most governments and most private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to 
date are highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they 
would have been stymied if they had been in place and were confronted with a rogue sovereign 
debtor such as Argentina. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 ‘The current non-system does not achieve the described objectives of restructuring. Instead, it 
creates a host of inequities as well as inefficiencies. It overpenalizes debtors in distress, causing 
delays in the recognition of the problems. It leads to the ‘too little, too late’ syndrome. In some 
cases, there is too much lending – and too much suffering later on; in other cases, there may be too 
little lending. Moreover, the legal frameworks permit a situation in which a few specialized agents 
(the vulture funds) can block the finalization of a restructuring, imposing large costs on the debtor 
and on other creditors’ (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a: 10). 
 
2 ‘The commission would not rule over different alternatives. Instead, the sovereign would finalize 
the process with a final proposal and the commission would produce statements about the 
reasonability of the process and the final proposal. This approach would serve to legitimate the 
restructuring or, alternatively, to legitimate positions that speak of illegitimate restructurings.’ 
(Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a: 22). 
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3 In the mid-1990s Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes had called for the establishment of an 
independent agency that ‘could provide mediation and conciliation services in negotiations between 
the debtor and creditors and, if desired by the parties themselves, binding arbitration’ (Eichengreen 
and Portes, 1995: 43), but the earliest proposal for an ad-hoc debt arbitration process was put forth 
by the Austrian economist Kunibert Raffer in the late 1980s (Raffer, 1990). With some of its 
features further developed, this concept was later on adopted by NGOs campaigning for debt relief 
as part of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, and is nowadays referred to as the Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Process (Fritz and Hersel, 2002). 
 
4 Bonds issued by euro-area sovereigns are required to include a CAC that allows for either a series-
by-series or a two-limb aggregated voting procedure. The latter enables differential treatment among 
creditors. For additional background and details, see Hofmann, 2014. 
 
5 In order to accommodate stylistic differences between legal markets, ICMA published in May 2015 
two different versions of the model clauses, one for English-law bonds and another for New York-
law bonds, see www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Resources/ICMA-Standard-CACs-Pari-
Passu-and-Creditor-Engagement-Provisions---May-2015.pdf, accessed 23 August 2016. 
 
6 ICMA (2014); see also the prior note and citation for the May 2015 version of the provision as 
tailored for sovereign bonds governed by New York law. 
 
7 This average would be considerably shorter if the sample were to exclude the longest delays, which 
had to do with unique restructuring strategies and the parallel restructuring of official sector and 
commercial loan debt simultaneously with the restructuring of the bond instruments (Duggar, 2013). 
 
8 The pari passu clause in the old Argentine bonds reads as follows: ‘[t]he Securities will constitute 
… direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all 
times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the 
Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and 
future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness …’ (Moody’s, 2014: 2). The U.S. 
federal courts interpreted it as requiring equal ranking of payment obligations under the relevant 
debts, and they prevented Argentina from making payments to the restructured bondholders 
without first making a ‘ratable payment’ to the holdout creditors (IMF, 2014: 37-44). 
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